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I. INTRODUCTION 
When the European Parliament (“EP”) failed to pass the carefully 
drafted thirteenth Directive related to Corporate Takeovers in Europe 
(“Takeover Directive”)1 in July of 2001,2 the European Commission 
 * Dr. Peer Zumbansen is a post-doctoral lecturer at the University of Frankfurt Law School. He 
holds degrees in law from the University of Frankfurt, the Université de Paris X Nanterre, and Harvard 
Law School, as well as a Ph.D. from Frankfurt. After a year-long research fellowship as a Jean Monnet 
Fellow at the European University Institute in Florence (2001–2002), he was a visiting professor at the 
University of Idaho College of Law in the Fall of 2003 and at Osgoode Hall Law School, York 
University, Toronto in Spring 2004. In April 2004, Dr. Zumbansen passed the Habilitation (full-
professor qualification) at the University of Frankfurt Law School and will take a Canada Research 
Chair for the Transnational and Comparative Law of Corporate Governance at Osgoode Hall Law 
School, York University, Toronto, Canada in the Fall of 2004. He is the co-founder and co-editor in 
chief of GERMAN LAW JOURNAL, at http://www.germanlawjournal.com. 
 1. See Christian Kirchner & Richard W. Painter, Takeover Defenses under Delaware Law, the 
Proposed Thirteenth EU Directive and the New German Takeover Law: Comparison and 
Recommendations for Reform, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 451, 455–56 (2002) (a concise account of the 
legislative history of the Directive dating back to the 1974 “Pennington Report” (Doc XI/56/74) and 
the first Commission Proposal of 1989). 
 2. See Press Release, European Commission, Commission Regrets Rejection of Takeovers 
Directive by the European Parliament (July 4, 2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
internal_market/en/company/company/news/01-943.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2004). In this 
communication, the EU Internal Market Commissioner, Frits Bolkestein, said,  
I am very disappointed that the European Parliament has not been able to ratify the agreement 
approved by its delegation last month, despite the tremendous efforts made by the 
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(“Commission”) immediately set out to overcome the obstacles that had 
ultimately prevented the Directive from passing.3 On September 4, 2001, 
precisely two months after the Directive was defeated in the EP,4 the 
Commission established the High Level Group of Company Law Experts 
(“Expert Group”). The Expert Group was charged with recording and 
Commission and the Council to meet the Parliament’s concerns. Twelve years of work have 
been wasted by today’s decision. This vote represents an important setback for achieving the 
targets agreed by the EU’s Heads of State and Government in Lisbon of realising an 
integrated European capital market by 2005 and making Europe the most competitive 
economy in the world by 2010. . . . It is tragic to see how Europe’s broader interests can be 
frustrated by certain narrow interests. 
Id. 
 3. See Janet Dine, The Framework Thirteenth Directive on Takeovers—The Protection of 
Shareholders and the Basis of Judicial Review of the Panel, in DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPEAN 
COMPANY LAW 201 (Barry A.K. Rider & Mads Andenas eds., 1996); Klaus-Heiner Lehne, Die 13. 
Richtlinie auf dem Gebiet des Gesellschaftsrechts betreffend Übernahmeangebote—gescheitert, aber 
dennoch richtungweisend für das künftige europäische Übernahmerecht [The Thirteenth Directive in 
the Field of Corporate Law concerning Acceptance Failed, but leads in the right direction for the 
future of European Acceptance], in WPÜG: DAS WERTPAPIERERWERBS—UND ÜBERNAHMEGESETZ 
MIT ÜBERNAHMEKODEX UND CITY CODE [GERMAN TAKEOVER STATUTE WITH TAKEOVER CODE AND 
CITY CODE] 33 (Heribert Hirte ed., 2002) [hereinafter WPÜG] (detailing the legislative history); 
Sorika Pluskat, Das Scheitern der europäischen Übernahmerichtlinie [The Failure of the European 
Takeover Directive], 55 WERTPAPIERMITTEILUNGEN 1937 (2001). 
 4. This failure attains almost tragic dimensions when considered in light of speculation that, had 
it not been for the late arrival of two British European parliamentarians, the Directive might actually 
have been passed on that occasion. See, e.g., Helen J. Callaghan, Paper for the 15th Annual Meeting of 
the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics, Aix-en-Provence, Battle of the Systems of 
Multi-Level Game? Domestic Sources of Anglo-German Quarrels over EU Takeover Law and Worker 
Consultation (June 26–28, 2003), available at http://www.sase.org/conf2003/papers/ 
callaghan_helen.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2004) (describing the effect that the Directive would have had 
on Germany’s takeover law, an effect that Germany had tried to avoid at all costs). But see Kirchner & 
Painter, supra note 1, at 461. The authors argue that, had it not been for the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) Advocate General’s (AG) statement made two days before the vote in the EP, the Directive 
would have passed the EP. Id. The AG’s role is to assess the legal merits of a case before the ECJ; the 
ECJ often then follows his assessment. The statement was made with regard to the pending case 
against Spain, Portugal and France concerning so-called “Golden Shares.” The AG criticized Golden 
Shares because he claimed that they would give the prior government owner of recently privatized 
state enterprises, in which the government continues to hold securities, veto rights in the event of a 
takeover attempt. Id. This announcement reinforced concerns that some Member States, including 
Germany, would be at a competitive disadvantage against France and the other Member States that 
permit Golden Shares. “The timing of this announcement, perhaps more than anything, sealed the fate 
of the Thirteenth Directive in Parliament.” Id. For an insightful assessment of the Court’s three 
“Golden Shares” decisions of June 4, 2003, see Johannes Adolff, Turn of the Tide? The “Golden 
Share” Judgments of the European Court of Justice and the Liberalization of the European Capital 
Markets, 3 GERMAN L.J. NO. 8 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/ 
article.php?id=170 (last visited Mar. 27, 2004). The ECJ ruled in two other cases involving “Golden 
Shares.” See Case C-463-00, Commission v. Kingdom of Spain, 2003 O.J. (C 158) 3; Case C-98/01, 
Commission v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and N. Ireland, 2003 O.J. (C 158) 4. Previously, the 
Commission had sent a formal request to the German government to “provide certain justifications” 
for its “Volkswagen law,” which gives Volkswagen’s home state of Lower Saxony favorable share 
voting rights in the publicly held Volkswagen AG (Mar. 19, 2003).  
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synthesizing the divergent takeover regimes and regulatory approaches of 
the Member States as a first step5 in the preparaton of a new proposal.6 In 
light of the exhaustive diplomatic and legislative struggles leading up to 
the 2001 vote in the EP, in particular with regard to the question of how a 
European takeover regime could ensure a level playing field among 
Member States with very different corporate law and securities regulation 
systems,7 the Expert Group’s report on takeover law was greatly 
anticipated. Shortly after its presentation on January 10, 2002, the Expert 
Group initiated a public consultation procedure regarding the Group’s 
second task. This procedure was designed to foster well-informed 
discussion among interested parties from all Member States regarding a 
wide range of corporate law issues. The discussions would not be limited 
exclusively to takeover regulation.8
The Commission presented its second draft of the Takeover Directive 
on October 2, 2002.9 The second draft adopted many of the Expert 
Group’s proposals, including a prohibition against any defensive 
measures10 taken by management without prior shareholder approval,11 
 5. See REPORT OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS ON ISSUES RELATED 
TO TAKEOVERS, (Jan. 10, 2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/ 
company/news/hlg01-2002.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2004). 
 6. In addition, the Expert Group, under its chairman, Jaap Winter, was asked to provide the 
Commission with “independent advice . . . on key priorities for modernizing company law in the 
European Union.” Id. at 1. See The High Level Group of Company Law Experts, A Modern 
Regulatory Approach for Company Law in Europe, (Nov. 4, 2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/ 
comm/internal_market/en/company/company/modern/consult/report_en.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 
2004). 
 7. Other issues of great concern included the controversial requirement of a mandatory offer by 
the control-acquiring bidder to all shareholders, the disclosure of all conditions of the bid, the right of 
corporate management to adopt defensive measures against a hostile bid (“neutrality rule”), the 
participation of non-shareholder stakeholders in the decision-making process in a takeover situation, 
and squeeze-out and sell-out rights in situations where the bidder or those acting in concert therewith 
have acquired the controlling percentage of voting rights in the company. For a list of disputed issues, 
see Kirchner & Painter, supra note 1, at 458. For a comprehensive history and discussion of the 
Commission’s attempts to develop a European takeover regime, see Theodor Baums, Zur 
Harmonisierung des Rechts der Unternehmensübernahmen in der EG [Harmonizing Takeover Law in 
the EU], Universität Osnabrück, Institut für Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht, WORKING PAPERS 03/95 
(1995), available at http://www.jura.uni-osnabrueck.de/institut/hwr/PDF/a0395.pdf (last visited Feb. 
1, 2004) [hereafter Baums, Zur Harmonisierung]. 
 8. See Press Release, European Commission, A Modern Regulatory Framework for Company 
Law in Europe: A Consultative Document of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts (Apr. 
25, 2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/ 
02/625|0|RAPID&lg=EN&display= (last visited Feb. 1, 2004). 
 9. See Proposal for Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Takeover Bids, 
COM(02)534 final, (Oct. 2, 2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/pdf/2002/ 
com2002_0534en01.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2004) [hereinafter Draft Proposal]. 
 10. For a brief description of the most common anti-takeover defensive measures, see Kirchner 
& Painter, supra note 1, at 452. 
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and regulation of mandatory bids to make all shareholders a bid at an 
equitable price after the bidders have obtained a qualifying amount of 
shares.12 The latter regulation reflects a central point of divergence 
between Continental and Anglo-American approaches to takeover 
regulation.13 In addition, the Commission adopted the proposals made by 
both the Expert Group and the European Parliament with regard to 
including an “equitable price” requirement14 and regulating “squeeze-
out”15 and “sell-out” procedures.16 Finally, the draft proposal established 
an obligation upon the management of both the bidder and the target 
corporation to inform employees about a bid. The draft proposal explicitly 
referred to Member State laws and previous EC Directives regarding 
worker participation and involvement.17 It invoked these rules by requiring 
employee involvement in deliberations regarding the possible 
consequences of a takeover.18
Altogether, however, the new draft, while clearly influenced by the 
Expert Group report, did not embrace all of its recommendations.19 This is 
particularly true of the “breakthrough rule” that the report suggested as a 
means for overcoming the obstacles that previously prevented the 
Directive from passing.20 The breakthrough rule,21 which was a central and 
defining feature of the Expert Group’s proposal, was intended to allow a 
bidder, upon acquiring a qualifying majority of the target company’s 
 11. See Draft Proposal, supra note 9, at art. 9. 
 12. See Draft Proposal, supra note 9, at art. 5. 
 13. See Paul Davies, The Notion of Equality in European Takeover Regulation, in TAKEOVERS IN 
ENGLISH AND GERMAN LAW 9 (Jennifer Payne ed., 2002). 
 14. In the event that the bidder and those acting in concert with him acquire a controlling 
percentage of the Corporation’s voting shares, the minority shareholders must be offered an equitable 
price for their shares. Draft Proposal, supra note 9, art. 5(1). The equitable price of a share is defined 
as the highest price paid for such a share by the same offeror (or those acting in concert with him) over 
a period between six and twelve months prior to the bid. Id. art. 5(4). 
 15. A squeeze-out right is the bidder’s right, after having made a bid to all holders of the target 
company for all of their securities, to require the holders of the remaining securities to sell the bidder 
those shares at a fair price. Id. art. 14. 
 16. A sell-out right is the right of a minority shareholder to require the bidder, after a bid to all 
shareholders, to buy the remaining securities from the minority shareholder at a fair price. Id. art. 15. 
 17. See Council Directive 94/45/EC, 1994 O.J. (L 254) 64 (Works Councils); Council Directive 
98/59/EC, 1998 (L 225) 16 (Collective Redundancies); Directive 2002/14/EC, 2002 O.J. (L 80) 29 
(Employee Information and Consultation), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/search/ 
search_lif.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2004). 
 18. See Draft Proposal, supra note 9, at 10. 
 19. A concise outline of the Commission’s approach for its new proposal can be found in its 
“Explanatory Memorandum.” Id. at 3–5. 
 20. See REPORT OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS ON ISSUES RELATED 
TO TAKEOVER BIDS, supra note 5, at 4. 
 21. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss3/5
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stock, to override all existing defensive measures by the target’s 
management, including any differentiation of voting rights. All Member 
States voiced intense criticism against this rule, which led the Commission 
to exclude this instrument from its latest draft proposal.22 The Commission 
instead adopted a “mini,” or “limited” breakthrough rule23 that blocked the 
transfer of certain classes of stock and prohibited voting restrictions.24 In 
light of the emerging conflict between the Commission and the Expert 
Group, the EP commissioned Professors Barbara Dauner Lieb and Marco 
Lamandini to provide an independent assessment of these regulatory 
issues in June of 2002. In this assessment, particular emphasis was placed 
on establishing a level playing field among participating states, despite the 
diversity of takeover regimes in Europe and differences between Europe 
and the United States. The report by Dauner Lieb and Lamandini25 largely 
embraced the Expert Group’s recommendations. In particular, the report 
offered a critique of the draft proposal’s exclusion of multiple voting 
rights in the regulatory context of the mini-breakthrough rule.26
The last chapter of this exhausting law-making enterprise is the EP’s 
positive vote on the new Directive proposal on December 16, 2003 and the 
Council’s formal vote on the Directive’s passage on March 30, 2004. The 
revised proposal, which was presented on November 27, 2003, surely 
signified the final attempt for the successful adoption of a Europe-wide 
takeover regime.27 The Directive28 that was signed by the Council and the 
EP on April 21, 2004, must be adopted by the Member States by 2006. In 
response to the intensive debates that have gone on over the past few 
years, the present Directive—in its newly inserted art. 11A—embraces an 
optional scheme for defensive measures that delegates a number of 
 22. See Erik Berglöf & Mike Burkart, European Takeover Regulation, ECON. POL’Y 171, 174 
(2003). 
 23. See Barbara Dauner-Lieb, Das Tauziehen um die Übernahmerichtlinie—eine 
Momentaufnahme [The Struggle over the Takeover Directive—A Snapshot], DEUTSCHES 
STEUERRECHT [GERMAN TAX LAW] 555, 556 (2003). See also Dauner-Lieb & Lamandini, Report to 
the European Parliament on the Commission’s new proposal of a Directive on company law 
concerning takeover bids, STUDY NO. IV/2002/06/01 at 7, available at http://www.uni-koeln.de/jur-
fak/lbrah/pdf_docs/gutachten_daunerlieb_lamandini_en.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2004) [hereinafter 
Report to the European Parliament]. 
 24. See Draft Proposal, supra note 9, art. 11. 
 25. See Report to the European Parliament, supra note 23. 
 26. See id. at 42–46. 
 27. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Takeover Bids, at 
http://www.jura.uni-duesseldorf.de/dozenten/noack/Texte/Sonstige/TO2003.htm (last visited May 7, 
2004).  
 28. The Directive’s text is available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/st15/ 
st15476.en03.pdf (last visited May 7, 2004). 
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strategic choices back to the corporate actors themselves.29 At the same 
time, the Member State can choose to adopt or to reject the much-disputed 
neutrality rule (art. 9) and the breakthrough rule (art. 11). Companies, it 
should be noted, are given the freedom to opt into this regime.30 In light of 
the quarrels that have accompanied the passage of the Directive, it is still 
too early to predict exactly how the Member States will react to the 
Directive in their transformation process.31 At the same time, its recent 
adoption appears to give testimony to what insightful observers of the 
European Integration have coined “reflexive harmonization.”32 Future 
discussion regarding the implementation of the Directive will reveal the 
extent to which Member States, as well as political and corporate actors, 
will take advantage of the potential for creative interpretation and engage 
in mutual learning throughout the process of transposing the Directive into 
national law. A brief retrospective into the history of Europe’s 
harmonization program will allow us to better situate the challenges and 
intricacies that unfolded in the context of the Takeover Directive. 
II. THE ASPIRATIONS AND FRUSTRATIONS OF EUROPE’S HARMONIZATION 
PROGRAM 
New attempts by the European Commission to pass a European 
takeover directive must be examined within the context of the instrument’s 
extensive legislative history. In 1974, the Commission requested a report 
from Robert Pennington33 that was intended to “review the European 
 29. See Silja Maul & Danièle Muffat-Jeandet, Die Übernahmerichtlinie—Inhalt und Umsetzuung 
in nationales Recht (Teil I), [The Takeover Directive—Contents and Transformation into National 
Law (Part I)] 49 AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 221, 222 (2004); Silja Maul & Athanasios Kouloridas, The 
Takeover Bids Directive, 5 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 355 (2004), Apr. 1, 2004, available at 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol05No04/PDF_Vol_05_No_04_355-366_Private_Maul_Ko
uloridas.pdf (last visited May 7, 2004). 
 30. For a concise description of the optional regime, see Maul & Kouloridas, supra note 29, at 
356–59. 
 31. For an assessment of the need for legislative adaptation of the German Takeover Law, see 
Peter M. Wiesner, Die neue Übernahmerichtlinie und die Folgen, [The New Takeover Directive and 
the Consequences] ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (ZIP) 343 (2004); Hartmut Krause, Die EU-
Übernahmerichtlinie—Anpassungsbedarf im Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz [The EU 
Takeover Directive—Need for Adaptation in the WpÜG (German Takeover Statute)], 59 
BETRIEBSBERATER [BB] 113 (2004). 
 32. See Simon Deakin, Regulatory Competition versus Reflexive Harmonisation in European 
Company Law, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES 209 (Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin eds., 2001).  
 33. EC-Commission Doc. XI/56/74. See KLAUS J. HOPT, UNIVERSITA DEGLI STUDI DI ROMA—
LA SAPIENZA, CENTRO DI STUDI E RICERCHE DI DIRITTO COMPARATO E STRANIERO [UNIVERSITY OF 
ROME—LA SAPIENZA, CENTER FOR THE STUDY AND RESEARCH OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL], 
COMPANY LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: HARMONIZATION OR SUBSIDIARITY 7 (Rome 1998), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss3/5
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takeover landscape and to prepare a first draft of a proposal in respect to 
takeover bids.”34 Fifteen years later, in 1989, the Commission presented its 
first draft proposal.35 Although the Pennington Report failed to cull 
sufficient Member State support to pursue a Europe-wide installment of 
takeover rules at that time, the Commission’s landmark White Paper of 
1985, concerning the completion of the internal market, changed this 
attitude.36 The Commission outlined, inter alia, an agenda for the creation 
of “conditions likely to favour the development of cooperation between 
undertakings.”37 In the White Paper, the Commission alluded to the wide 
variety of corporate law regimes pertaining to the regulation of takeovers 
among the Member States. Above all, it envisioned the creation of equal 
standards with regard to “the information to be given to those concerned, 
while it would be left to the Member State to devise procedures for 
monitoring such operations and to designate the authorities to which the 
powers of supervision were to be assigned.”38 This principled approach, 
however, was sacrificed in part during the ensuing discussions and 
proposals for the directive in the years following the White Paper. The 
Commission, having finally presented its first draft directive in 1989, 
recognized the need to present a revised proposal as early as 1990,39 after 
it received substantial criticism and numerious recommendations from 
both the European Community’s Economic and Social Committee 
(ECOSOC) and the EP.40 In response to growing economic pressure felt 
by Member States during the mid- to late 1980s and the addition of the 
subsidiarity principle to the EC Treaty via the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 
(according to which regulatory competence was deemed to rest with 
Member States in all fields where regulation had not explicitly been 
available at http://w3.uniroma1.it/idc/centro/publications/31hopt.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2004). 
 34. CHRISTIN M. FORSTINGER, TAKEOVER LAW IN THE EU AND THE USA: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 99 (2002). 
 35. See Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law Concerning Takeover and 
Other General Bids, 1989 O.J. (C 64) 8. 
 36. See Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European 
Council, COM(85)310 final, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/off/pdf/1985_0310_f_en.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2004). 
 37. Id. at 34. The document largely established the legislative approach eventually adopted by 
the Commission in its 1996 draft proposal. Proposal for a 13th European Parliament and Council 
Directive on Takeover Bids, 1996 O.J. (C 162) 6. This draft signified a distinctive step away from the 
full harmonization approach of the takeover regimes in various member states at the European level in 
favor of the “framework” approach of the Commission. See FORSTINGER, supra note 34, at 103–08 
(providing a careful description of the framework approach taken in the Commission’s draft proposal). 
 38. COM(85)310 final, supra note 36, at 35. 
 39. See 1990 O.J. (C 240); COM(90)416 final (explanatory memorandum thereto). 
 40. See Draft proposal, supra note 9, at 2 (explanatory memorandum). 
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assigned to the European Community41), the Commission announced that 
it would prepare a revised draft proposal for a takeover directive. After 
numerous delays, this proposal was finally presented to the Council and 
the EP on February 8, 1996.42 This revised proposal signified a decisive 
turning point in what had previously been little more than a tedious and 
exhausting process for lawmakers and negotiators. The “framework” 
approach adopted by the Commission in its 1996 proposal contained 
general principles for a Europe-wide takeover regime that left the Member 
States substantial latitude for interpretation when converting the Directive 
into national law. Upon further recommendations from both the ECOSOC 
and the EP, the Commission adopted an amended proposal in November 
of 1997.43 This amended proposal led to a common position that was 
unanimously accepted by the Council on June 19, 200044 and by the 
Commission on July 26, 2000. This version was a source of furious debate 
among Member States until it was ultimately defeated in July of 2001.45
Until as recently as the autumn of 2003, it was difficult to predict 
whether and when a new directive would come to pass. The greater 
economic and socio-political factors, which hardly seem to be captured by 
the “level playing field” terminology, appeared to have successfully 
delayed, or even buried, all further attempts at a takeover directive that 
would pursue an agenda as ambitious as the Commission’s latest Proposal. 
Now, in May 2004, it has become obvious that the Italian proposal for an 
option model,46 while immediately and sternly criticized by Internal 
 41. For a description and critique of the use of the subsidiarity principle with regard to the 
takeover Directive, see HOPT, supra note 33, at 9–12 (arguing that both the subsidiarity principle and 
the framework conception of the Commission’s Directive proposals remained too vague and could not, 
therefore, delineate the boundaries for Community competences); George Bermann, Taking 
Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 331 (1994) (providing a canonical comparative analysis of EU and US federalism and the role 
played by the subsidiarity principle herein); Patrick R Hugg, Transnational Convergence: European 
Union and American Federalism, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 43, 101 (1998) (asserting that, in spite of the 
subsidiarity principle, the EU deepened its competences pursuant to the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty); 
Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European Union: Some Cautionary Tales 
from American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1612, 1636 (2002) (describing the introduction of the 
subsidiarity principle in the Maastricht Treaty as a response to the expansion of community 
competences and the ECJ’s “aggressive promotion of community law”). 
 42. See 1996 O.J. (C 162) 5, supra note 37; COM(95)655 (explanatory memorandum thereto). 
 43. See Amended Proposal for a Thirteenth European Parliament and Council Directive on 
Company Law Concerning Takeover Bids, 1997 O.J. (C 378); FORTSINGER, supra note 34, at 101. 
 44. 2001 O.J. (C 23). 
 45. See Kirchner & Painter, supra note 1, at 456. Before the Draft Directive failed to gain 
parliamentary approval on July 4, 2001, the Conciliation Committee had carefully, and with much 
devotion, crafted an agreement on June 6, 2001, that led to the previously mentioned Common 
Position of June 19, 2000. 
 46. See Gerard Hertig & Joseph McCahery, Towards a Pro-Choice EU-Takeover Bids Directive, 
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Market Commissioner Frits Bolkestein,47 did eventually open new avenues 
for passing a takeover directive. With the Directive finally passed by the 
EP, and adopted and signed by the Council in April 2004, the debate over 
its merits, nevertheless, appears to be far from closed. Against this 
background, to write or edit a book on takeover law is truly a courageous 
undertaking. It is also this background, however, against which we can 
assess a number of recent publications dealing with takeover law in 
particular, and with European regulatory competition in general. 
III. WRITING ON A MOVING TARGET 
Of the three books herein reviewed,48 two present comparative 
assessments, one between the UK and Germany, and the other between the 
US and the EU. The third book assembles what is bound to become a 
classical collection of major writings on the continuing debate over the 
convergence or divergence of corporate governance systems.49 All three 
CTR. FOR EUR. POL’Y STUD. (Jan. 2004), available at http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article_id= 
131& (last visited Mar. 28, 2004). 
 47. “A particular source of disappointment is the way in which the takeovers Directive has fallen 
victim to horsetrading and unholy alliances of convenience related to totally extraneous issues.” 
Furthermore,  
The Competitiveness Council says that it wants to be seen to be taking decisions. In all 
sincerity, I have to say that if the Council continues to take decisions like this one, the 
European Union will never reach its target of becoming the most competitive economy in the 
world by 2010. On this issue, we have actually gone a long way in reverse gear since the 
Council endorsed the previous takeovers Directive in June 2001, with 14 Member States in 
favour. 
Memo/03/245, European Commission, Results of the Competitiveness Council of Ministers, (Nov. 28, 
2003), available at http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc 
=MEMO/03/245|0|AGED&lg=EN&display= (last visited Mar. 30, 2004). 
 48. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY (Joseph A. McCahery 
et al. eds., 2002); FORSTINGER, supra note 34; TAKEOVERS IN ENGLISH AND GERMAN LAW, supra note 
13. 
 49. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES, supra note 48, at Pt. I. For an earlier landmark 
collection of papers in this relatively young debate, see COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE—
STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING RESEARCH (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998); Brian R. Cheffins, 
Current Trends in Corporate Governance: Going from London to Milan via Toronto, 10 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 5 (1999) [hereinafter Cheffins, Current Trends]; Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing 
Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329 (2001); Jeffrey 
N. Gordon, Pathways to Corporate Governance? Two Steps on the Road to Shareholder Capitalism in 
Germany, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 219 (1999) [hereinafter Gordon, Pathways]; Jennifer Hill, 
Introduction: Comparative Corporate Governance and Takeovers, 24 SYDNEY L. REV. 319 (2002); 
Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 791 (2002); Edward Rock, America’s Shifting Fascination with Comparative 
Corporate Governance, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 367 (1996); Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate 
Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993) [hereinafter Roe, 
Some Differences]; Detlev Vagts, Reforming the “Modern Corporation”: Perspectives from the 
German, 80 HARV. L. REV. 23 (1966); Mark D. West, The Puzzling Divergence of Corporate Law: 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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volumes appeared shortly after the directive was defeated in the EP. 
Unfortunately, there was too little temporal distance to include all ensuing 
and ongoing discussions sparked by that event. Allowing more time to 
lapse between the directive’s defeat and the publication of these volumes, 
however, would have had little, if any, influence on the texts. These 
works, particularly the volumes by Payne and Forstinger, attempt to 
provide a greater picture of takeover regulation by including domestic, 
international, and comparative perspectives. The juxtaposition of these 
dimensions has proven pivotal to the discussions and inquiries of both the 
last decade and previous decades.50 Amidst the overwhelming amount of 
recent scholarship on comparative corporate governance in general,51 and 
takeovers in particular,52 these three volumes neither claim nor assume a 
position as proverbial leader of the pack. The host of regulatory, 
economic, political, historical, and cultural issues connected in one way or 
another with takeover regulation is so diverse that a single publication 
could rarely leave a reader completely satisfied.53 The books under review, 
however, do provide us with a wide array of valuable insights into the 
pressing issues related to takeovers. This ultimately makes all of them 
very timely, interesting, and inspiring reading. 
The comparative perspective on English and German takeover laws, 
originally assembled by Jennifer Payne for a workshop in Oxford in 
Evidence and Explanations from Japan and the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 527 (2001). 
 50. See RICHARD BUXBAUM & KLAUS J. HOPT, LEGAL HARMONIZATION AND THE BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISE (1988). 
 51. See Bolkstein, supra note 47 ; John W. Cioffi, State of the Art: A Review Essay on 
Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and Emerging Research, 48 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 501 (2000). Another insightful analysis with comparative views on France and Germany is provided 
in Mary O’Sullivan, The Political Economy of Comparative Corporate Governance, 10 REV. INT’L 
POL. ECON. 23 (2003). 
 52. See John W. Cioffi, Restructuring “Germany Inc.”: The Politics of Corporate Governance 
Reform in Germany and the European Union, 24 L. & POL’Y 355 (2002) [hereinafter Cioffi, 
Restructuring “Germany Inc.”]; Simon Deakin & Giles Slinger, Hostile Takeovers, Corporate Law, 
and the Theory of the Firm, 24 J. L.& SOC’Y 124 (1997) (concise analysis and comparative approach 
to takeover law in Europe, with particular emphasis on the United Kingdom, the United States, and 
Germany). 
 53. For different methods for exploring these backgrounds, see MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL 
DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT (2003); 
Roe, Some Differences, supra note 49. Much of the “Varieties of Capitalism” literature has been 
devoted to the exploration of comparative corporate governance, with particular emphasis on the 
historical trajectories and structural conditions of corporate governance systems. See Sigurt Vitols, 
Varieties of Corporate Governance: Comparing Germany and the UK, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: 
THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 337 (Peter A. Hall & David 
Soskice eds., 2001). For insightful approaches that reach beyond the “Varieties of Capitalism” 
perspectives on “comparative institutional advantages,” see Callaghan, supra, note 4; Cioffi, 
Restructuring “Germany Inc.”, supra note 52. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss3/5
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September of 2001, unfolds in a particularly useful manner. Despite the 
drastic differences between the structural economic foundations of the two 
countries, hardly any other country’s takeover laws have left as significant 
an imprint on Germany’s takeover legislation over the years as those of 
the United Kingdom.54 Germany has recently undergone a veritable tour 
de force with regard to adapting both its securities and corporate law to the 
radical pressures of globalized capital markets.55 Germany continues to 
find itself under conflicting pressures, as market players and the 
government undertake substantial efforts to bring into line Germany’s 
notoriously dense network of closely-held corporations, strong cross-
holdings among major industrial players and financial institutions. German 
stock corporations’ two-tiered board of managers and supervisors are also 
to be brought in line with the capital market demands of international 
investors.56 The conversion from bank-centered, long-term financing 
relationships between large German firms and financial institutions to 
conditions that make Germany attractive to foreign investment has been a 
lengthy, ongoing struggle. This process has ultimately spurred a 
fundamental debate over the merits of historically-grown corporate law 
structures. The British-German comparison taken up by the authors in 
Payne’s collection is remarkably helpful for addressing the structural 
elements that naturally came under pressure when Germany tackled its 
system of Rhenish capitalism,57 most notably through the passage of the 
Transparency Act in 1998.58 In light of the ensuing European 
developments concerning a takeover directive that would eliminate 
 54. A good comparative view on Germany and the UK is given by Paul L. Davies, Shareholder 
Value, Company Law, and Securities Markets Law: A British View, in CAPITAL MARKETS AND 
COMPANY LAW 261 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 2003); Paul L. Davies, Struktur der 
Unternehmensführung in Großbritannien und in Deutschland: Konvergenz oder fortbestehende 
Divergenz? [Structure of Corporate Governance in the UK and Germany: Convergence or Persisting 
Divergence?], 30 Z.G.R. 269 (2001); Gregory Jackson, Comparative Corporate Governance: 
Sociological Perspectives, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE COMPANY 265 (John Parkinson et al. 
eds, 2000); Vitols, supra note 53. 
 55. See Theodor Baums, Company Law Reform in Germany, 3 J. CORP. STUD. 181 (2003) 
[hereinafter Baums, Company Law Reform]. 
 56. See, e.g., Klaus J.Hopt, Takeovers, Secrecy, and Conflicts of Interest: Problems for Boards 
and Banks, in TAKEOVERS IN ENGLISH AND GERMAN LAW, supra note 13, at 33; Thorsten Pötzsch, 
Regulatory Structures, in TAKEOVERS IN ENGLISH AND GERMAN LAW, supra note 13, at 75; see also 
Klaus J. Hopt, Common Principles of Corporate Governance in Europe, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
REGIMES, supra note 48, at 176–81 (describing the differences between the one-tiered and two-tiered 
board systems in Great Britain, the United States, and Germany). 
 57. See MICHEL ALBERT, CAPITALISME CONTRE CAPITALISME [CAPITALISM VS. CAPITALISM] 
(1991) (classical assessment of so-called “Rhenish capitalism”). 
 58. Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich [Law Regarding Corporate 
Control and Transparency] April 27, 1998 (BGBl. I p.786). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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managerial discretion when launching defensive measures against hostile 
bids and would work toward a European market for corporate control, the 
passage of the Act now seems like a watershed moment. Meanwhile, it has 
become clear that the Act exposed German companies to dangers that had 
not been fully anticipated,59 by weakening German companies’ defenses 
against takeover bids. Takeover bids were largely unknown in Germany 
until recently. The headline-making takeover of the German industrial 
giant Mannesmann by the British Telecommunications firm Vodafone in 
1999–200060 was a wake-up call for German lawmakers, which forced 
them to seriously reconsider the future avenues they would utilize to 
restructure German corporate and securities law. Realistic methods had to 
be assessed in light of both an increased demand by German companies 
for foreign capital, as well as widespread fear surrounding the replacement 
of Germany’s long-tested forms of internal control of company boards 
through the supervisory board complemented with various, market-based 
forms of outside control through the stock market.61 An intimate American 
observer of German corporate governance, Jeffrey Gordon, recently 
observed:  
In the years that the 13th Directive was debated, Germany moved 
from a closed to a more open system of corporate control; many of 
its extra-board barriers came down. This took place through 
significant corporate law changes, for example, the end of capped 
voting and new limitations on bank exercise of customer proxies. 
Also important was a tax law change, the phase out in January 2002 
of the capital gains tax on the sale of corporate shareholdings, that 
would eliminate the financial lock-in of corporate cross-
shareholdings. There were also ownership structure changes that 
produced over the 1990’s a significant increase in the number of 
firms with dispersed ownership without a large blockholder. . . . 
 59. See Cioffi, Restructuring “Germany, Inc.”, supra note 52 (careful reconstruction of the 
political process leading up to the Transparency Act and the German government’s attempts to re-
establish protective walls in negotiating the European Takeover Directive). 
 60. See Martin Höpner & Gregory Jackson, Entsteht ein Markt für Unternehmenskontrolle? Der 
Fall Mannesmann [Is There a Market for Corporate Control? The Case of Mannesmann], in ALLE 
MACHT DEM MARKT? STUDIEN ZUR ABWICKLUNG DER DEUTSCHLAND AG [ALL POWER TO THE 
MARKET? STUDIES OF GROWTH IN GERMAN CORPORATIONS] 147 (Wolfgang Streeck & Martin 
Höpner eds., 2003) 
 61. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, An American Perspective on the New German Anti-Takeover Law, 
Die Aktiengesellschaft, vol. 12, at 4 (Dec. 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=336420 
[hereinafter Gordon, An American Perspective]. The different ownership and control structures of 
American, English, German, and other European companies is described in great detail in 
FORSTINGER, supra note 34, at 48–56. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss3/5
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Germany had opened itself to the market for corporate control to a 
much greater extent than its EU partners, except for the UK, and, 
not unreasonably in my view, was concerned about potential harms 
from economic nationalism potentiated by an incompletely 
liberalized cross-border regime.62
IV. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LAWMAKING 
These events clearly show that an ongoing comparative dialogue is 
needed.63 At the beginning of his presentation at the 2001 workshop in 
Oxford, Klaus Hopt remarked on the irony of a German corporate law 
scholar speaking in England about takeover law.64 While Germany had not 
historically experienced many takeovers, England’s experience with both 
takeovers and takeover regulation was very rich. The City Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers, adopted as a self-regulatory instrument in 1992, 
served as a primary model for Germany’s first attempt to create a takeover 
code in 1996: the Übernahmekodex.65 Unfortunately, the Code’s full 
regulatory potential was never realized because many large companies did 
not adhere to it. A remarkable development later ensued: German 
 62. Gordon, An American Perspective, supra note 61, at 4. For an assessment of the changed 
conditions of the role of banks in German companies, see Hopt, Common Principles of Corporate 
Governance in Europe?, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES, supra note 48, at 186–88; Peter O. 
Mülbert, Bank Equity Holdings in Non-Financial Firms and Corporate Governance: The Case of 
German Universal Banks, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 49, at 445. 
 63. See Cheffins, Current Trends, supra note 49, at 5–6. 
The topic should not be studied in isolation within any one country. Instead, corporate 
governance is becoming an important issue in all industrial economies, and students of the 
topic need to be aware of what is occurring outside their respective countries. As trade 
barriers fall, markets expand, information flows improve, and restrictions on investment 
disappear, it will become progressively easier for investors of one country to invest in 
corporations in another. Movement towards a worldwide capital market could in turn have a 
substantial impact on corporate governance in individual countries. In a world with intense 
competition for global savings, sophisticated investors will be attracted to jurisdictions in 
which investment structures serve shareholders' interests. Since the attractiveness of a 
particular locality will depend on its system of corporate governance, local norms may be 
adjusted to make domestic markets more accommodating to global trends. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 64. TAKEOVERS IN ENGLISH AND GERMAN LAW, supra note 48, at 3. “To talk in England about 
takeovers and takeover regulation is, to quote the Romans, ‘carrying owls to Athens.’” Id. 
 65. See Patrick Drayton, Regulatory Structures, in TAKEOVERS IN ENGLISH AND GERMAN LAW, 
supra note 48, at 65 (2002) (concise assessment of the Takeover Code and its application to the 
Takeover Panel, the Financial Services Authority, and the courts); Tobias A. Heinrich, Bedeutung und 
Regelungsprogramm des englischen City Code und der Rules Governing Substantial Acquisitions of 
Shares [Meaning and Regulations of the English City Code and the Rules Governing Substantial 
Acquisitions of Shares], in WPÜG, supra note 3, at 45. 
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lawmakers prepared a legislative takeover statute in a climate 
characterized by both a widespread belief that such a statute was indeed 
needed and a deep-rooted skepticism about its possible regulatory scope. 
This development is concisely depicted in Hopt’s chapter in Payne’s 
collection.66 Corporations in Germany had come under pressure as a result 
of the developments described above and, in the meanwhile, the legislature 
resumed active engagement in conceptualizing and preparing a federal 
takeover statute in 1997, twenty-two years after its first attempts in 1975.67 
One of the most striking developments that followed the European 
Takeover Directive’s defeat in the summer of 2001 was the passage of a 
national takeover statute by the German parliament during December of 
that year, taking effect on January 1, 2002.68 This statute, the scope of 
which is well worth a number of subsequent discussions among the 
authors of the volumes considered here, has inspired substantial 
commentary, both critical and affirmative.69 Rendering the story of 
European takeover law even more open-ended, the German legislature 
granted the management of target companies the right to adopt defensive 
measures against hostile bids without prior approval from the general 
shareholder assembly.70 This formula reflects the legislature’s belief in the 
competence of management to decide on takeover bids, without the need 
for authorization from the shareholder assembly.71
 66. TAKEOVERS IN ENGLISH AND GERMAN LAW, supra note 13, at 33.
 67. See Theodor Baums, Vorschlag eines Gesetzes zu öffentlichen Übernahmeangeboten 
[Proposal for a Public Take-Over Bids Law], ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (ZIP) 1310 
(1997). 
 68. Gesetz zur Regelung von öffentlichen Angeboten zum Erwerb von Wertpapieren und 
Unternehmensübernahmen [Law to Regulate Public Takeover Offers Through Securities Acquisition 
and Takeovers], Dec. 20, 2001 (BGBl. I p.3822). 
 69. See Cioffi, Restructuring “Germany Inc.”, supra note 52; Gordon, An American Perspective, 
supra note 61; Kirchner & Painter, supra note 1; Frank Wooldridge, The New German Takeover Act, 
14 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 75 (2003). For comprehensive, practice-oriented commentary published since 
the Statute’s passage, see GERMAN TAKEOVER LAW—A COMMENTARY (Gabriele Apfelbacher et al. 
eds., 2002); JOHANNES ADOLFF ET AL., PUBLIC COMPANY TAKEOVERS IN GERMANY (2002); WPÜG, 
supra note 3; RUDOLF NÖRR & ALFRED STIEFENHOFER, TAKEOVER LAW IN GERMANY (2003). 
 70. Takeover Code § 33(1) reads 
After publication of the decision to make a bid until the publication of the result in 
accordance with § 23 para. 1 sentence 1 no. 2, the management board of the target company 
may not take any action which could prevent the bid being successful. This does not apply to 
actions which would also have been taken in the course of due and diligent management of a 
company which is not affected by a takeover bid, seeking a competitive bid or to actions to 
which the supervisory board of the target company has agreed.  
Takeover Code § 33(1), translated in NÖRR & STIEFENHOFER, supra note 69, at 176. 
 71. See Takeover Act § 33(1), translated in NÖRR & STIEFENHOFER, supra note 69, at 176 
(emphasis added). While a board “may not take any action which could prevent the bid being 
successful,” those actions “which would also have been taken in the course of due and diligent 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss3/5
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While the discussion on takeover regulation continues,72 it is important 
to bear in mind that an adequate assessment of the regulatory context and 
the political economy, from which any takeover regulation arises, must be 
built upon careful consideration of the different historical developments 
and political decisions that have shaped various regulatory regimes.73 The 
works herein reviewed clearly reflect this awareness. This is particularly 
important in light of the fact that the international debate over convergence 
and divergence of corporate governance regimes, to which the volume 
edited by McCahery et al., provides an excellent contribution, develops in 
at least two other critical dimensions that have yet to achieve sufficient 
recognition within mainstream scholarship on corporate law. These 
dimensions concern the changes taking place with regard to the evolution 
of corporate law through a combination of private norm-generation 
through different methods of self-regulation and formal legislation.74 The 
radical changes to the process of lawmaking, through the emergence of 
corporate governance codes, codes of conduct, and recommendations of 
best practice that have recently evolved in Germany75 and in many other 
countries,76 as well as in international institutions,77 have an important 
management of a company which is not affected by a takeover bid, seeking a competitive bid” or 
“which the supervisory board of the target company has agreed” are excluded. Id. 
 72. See Gordon, An American Perspective, supra note 61; Kirchner & Painter, supra note 1. 
 73. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate 
Governance and Ownership, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999); Helmut Kohl, Path Dependence and 
German Corporate Law: Some Skeptical Remarks from the Sidelines, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 189 (1999); 
Mark J. Roe, Path Dependence, Political Options and Governance Systems, in COMPARATIVE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ESSAYS AND MATERIALS 165 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 
1997). 
 74. An important example is the German Corporate Governance Code, which was 
conceptualized and prepared by two government commissions between 2000 and 2002. This code 
provides corporate actors with a concise account and description of German corporate governance and 
offers recommendations for corporate behavior. German Corporate Governance Code, 
http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/index-e.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2004); see Theodor 
Baums, Interview: Reforming German Corporate Governance: Inside a Law Making Process of a very 
new nature, 2 GERMAN L.J. No. 12 (July 2001), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/ 
past_issues.php?id=43 [hereinafter Baums, Interview]; Baums, Company Law Reform, supra note 56. 
 75. See Baums, Interview, supra note 74; Bericht der Regierungskommission Corporate 
Governance—Unternehmensführung, Unternehmenskontrolle, Modernisierung des Aktienrechts 
[Report of the Government Commission Corporate Governance—Management of Enterprises—
Modernization of the Stock Corporation Law], Drucksache-Bundesrat 14/7515, Aug. 14, 2001; Peer 
Zumbansen, The Privatization of Corporate Law? Corporate Governance Codes and Commercial 
Self-Regulation, JURIDIKUM 136 (2002). 
 76. An instructive assessment of the UK is provided in BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW, 
THEORY, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION 346 (1997). For theoretical background, see Rob Baggott, 
Regulatory Reform in Britain: The Changing Face of Self-Regulation, 67 PUB. ADMIN. 435 (1989); 
Julia Black, Constitutionalising Self-Regulation, 59 MOD. L. REV. 24 (1996). 
 77. See, e.g., the Corporate Governance Principles issued by the OECD, available at 
http://www.oecd.org; see also Carolin F. Hillemanns, UN Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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bearing on our future assessment of corporate law from a comparative 
perspective. The constant and increasing export of established, albeit 
constantly evolving,78 systems of law into the unstable and developing 
markets of post-crisis regions or transformation states79 sounds an urgent 
call for reflection. Conducting comparative assessments of the conditions 
under which export or transplantation of substantive law takes place, as 
well as of how our law making procedures continue to change and unfold, 
can provide a valuable insight into how certain models have formed and 
into their resulting consequences. This contemplative process is 
particularly important with regard to the export of widespread corporate 
governance codes, best practice recommendations,80 and other market-
based, self-regulatory frameworks into countries undergoing dramatic 
restructuring of formerly state-run industries and economic 
infrastructures.81
The second, crucial dimension, ripe for review by contemporary 
corporate governance scholars, deals with the economic pressure 
experienced by mature industrial and post-industrial states to develop 
innovative means for economic and corporate growth. While this need 
may seem almost painfully commonplace,82 its realization, in the context 
of radically interconnected markets and immense pressure on local and 
transnational spheres of production,83 constitutes a pivotal issue for 
contemporary comparative scholars working with corparate governance.84
Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights, 4 GERMAN 
L.J. 1065 (2003) (for a development in international corporate social responsibility), available at 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol04No10/PDF_Vol_04_No_10_1065-1080_European_Hille
manns.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2003). 
 78. See Pistor et al., supra note 49. 
 79. See, e.g., Katharina Pistor, Of Legal Transplants, Legal Irritants, and Economic 
Development, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CAPITAL FLOWS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 347 (Peter 
Cornelius & Bruce Kogut eds., 2003); Erich Schanze, Legislating for System Change: The Russian 
Company Acts of 1995 and 1998, 156 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 19 (2000); Frederick Schauer, 
Legal Development and the Problem of Systemic Transition, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 261 
(2003). 
 80. See Country List, European Corporate Governance Institute, at http://www.ecgi.org/ 
codes/all_codes.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2004). 
 81. See KERRY RITTICH, RECHARACTERIZING RESTRUCTURING. LAW, DISTRIBUTION AND 
GENDER IN MARKET REFORM (2002). 
 82. See Reinventing Europe: Innovation: With so much of its industrial base ageing and resistant 
to change, how can Europe close the research and development gap with America?, THE ECONOMIST 
TECHNOLOGY QUARTERLY, Sept. 6, 2003, at 28, available at 2003 WL 58583964. 
 83. See J. Rogers Hollingsworth, New Perspectives on the Spatial Dimensions of Economic 
Coordination: Tensions Between Globalization and Social Systems of Production, 5 REV. INT'L POL. 
ECON. 482 (1998); Kathryn Ibata-Arens, The Comparative Political Economy of Innovation, 10 REV. 
INT'L POL. ECON. 147 (2003). 
 84. See Mary O’Sullivan, The Innovative Enterprise and Corporate Governance, 24 CAMBRIDGE 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss3/5
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V. TOWARD A NEW PARADIGM IN EUROPEAN CORPORATE LAW 
Against this background, this review develops an assessment of the 
comparative dialogues presented in Payne’s collection, as well as the 
books by Forstinger and the McCahery volume. Forstinger presents us 
with a detailed reconstruction of state-based regulation of corporate law 
and federal securities regulation in the United States as a means for 
comparing the American conditions for a market for corporate control with 
those existing in Europe.85 Meanwhile, the contributions in the volume 
edited by McCahery et al. supply a rich collection of insightful, often 
critical, assessments of the arguments made in the course of international 
debate over corporate governance. Forstinger’s work is well–structured, 
and her comparative assessment of the development of a market for 
corporate control and the contrastingly few opportunities for creating an 
equivalent market in the European Union is quite informative. At the same 
time, Fortsinger does not limit herself to an extensive treatment of the 
legislative and jurisprudential elements that mark the evolution of both 
markets. Instead, while descriptive in her treatment of the material used 
for her study, she leads the reader toward an inspiring outlook on the 
future development of European takeover regulation. Although Forstinger 
does not speculate regarding successful passage of the Commission’s 
badly wounded takeover directive in the near future,86 she has a sound 
basis for rejection of the notion that “full regulatory competition” will 
overcome the deadlock.87  
J. ECON. 393 (2000); Walter W. Powell, The Capitalist Firm in the Twenty-First Century: Emerging 
Patterns in Western Enterprise, in THE TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY FIRM: CHANGING ECONOMIC 
ORGANIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 33 (Paul Dimaggio ed., 2001); PEER ZUMBANSEN, 
INNOVATION UND PFADABHÄNGIGKEIT. DAS RECHT DER UNTERNEHMENSVERFASSUNG IN DER 
WISSENSGESELLSCHAFT [Innovation & Path-Dependence. The Constitution of the Firm in the 
Knowledge Society] (completed book manuscript, University of Frankfurt, forthcoming 2004/2005). 
 85. FORSTINGER, supra note 34, at 1 n.1. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: 
Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); contra ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF 
AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993); Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The 
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1982); Lucian 
Ayre Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from 
Takeovers, 99 COLUM L. REV. 1168 (1999); Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, On Takeover Law 
and Regulatory Competition, 57 BUS. LAW. 1047 (2002); David Charny, Competition among 
Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Rules: An American Perspective on the “Race to the Bottom” 
in the European Communities, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 423 (1991). 
 86. See FORSTINGER, supra note 34, at 154: “The rejection of the amended proposed takeover 
Directive has diminished a European framework for the regulation of takeovers, at least for the very 
near future.” Id. 
 87. Id. at 156. See also Baums, Zur Harmonisierung, supra note 7, at 14; Theodor Baums, Das 
Ende der Deutschland AG? Unternehmensrechtsreform in Deutschland [The End of Germany Inc.? 
Corporate Law Reform in Germany], in KAPITALMARKT DEUTSCHLAND: ERFOLGE UND 
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While conditions ripe for competitive federalism in Europe might still 
seem unattainable, the European Court of Justice’s recent Inspire Art 
ruling on September 30, 2003,88 as well as those preceding it, namely 
Centros and Überseering, might have dramatically altered this situation.89 
These cases go a long way toward resolving the struggle90 between those 
European corporate law regimes applying domestic law to corporations 
based in these countries (the “siege reel,” or “real seat” doctrine), and 
those embracing the dominant US model of state competition for 
incorporation (“incorporation doctrine”).91 Forstinger concludes her study 
with an intriguing reconsideration of the aforementioned 1985 White 
Paper that accommodated different interests within the framework of a 
single legal measure.92 In light of the persisting differences among EU 
Member States’ systems of corporate law, Forstinger takes up the recent 
and far-reaching observations of Simon Deakin93 and argues that 
“[m]inimum standards are seeking to promote diverse, local-level 
approaches to regulatory problems by creating a space for autonomous 
ENTWICKLUNGEN [GERMAN CAPITAL MARKET: RESULTS AND CHANGES] WHITE PAPER 39 (Deutsche 
Börse Group ed., 2003). 
 88. Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabriken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd., 
2003 O.J. (C 275) 10, available at http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi! 
prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=62001J0167&model=guichett (last visited Mar. 31, 2004); 
see Kersting & Schindler, The ECJ’s Inspire Art Decision of 30 September and Its Effects on Practice, 
in 4 GERMAN L.J. No. 12, 1277–91 (2003), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/ 
article.php?id=344 (last visited Mar. 31, 2004). 
 89. See Kilian Baelz & Teresa Baldwin, The End of the Real Seat Theory (Sitztheorie): The 
European Court of Justice Decision in Ueberseering of 5 November 2002 and its Impact on German 
and European Company Law, in 3 GERMAN L.J. No.12 (2002), available at 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/current_issue.php?id=214 (discussing the Court’s later ruling in 
Überseerung and the subsequent decisions on the development of regulatory competition in Europe); 
Simon Deakin, Regulatory Competition versus Reflexive Harmonisation in European Company Law, 
in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 190 
(Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin eds., 2001) (assessing the European corporate law scene after the 
court’s 1999 Centros judgment); Sebastian Mock, Harmonization, Regulation and Legislative 
Competition in European Corporate Law, 3 GERMAN L.J. No. 12 (2002), available at 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/current_issue.php?id=216 (last visited Oct. 3, 2003) (dealing with 
regulatory competition in the field of European Corporate law); Frank Wooldridge, Überseering: 
Freedom of Establishment of Companies Affirmed, 14 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 227 (2003). 
 90. For an analysis of Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-Org., 1999 O.J. (C 136) 3, see 
FORSTINGER, supra note 34, at 41 (providing an extensive discussion of the doctrinal conflict over this 
issue); Daniel Zimmer, Mysterium Centros—Von der schwierigen Suche nach der Bedeutung eines 
Urteils des Europäischen Gerichtshofes [The Mystery of Centros: The Difficult Search for the Meaning 
of the ECJ's Decision], 164 Z.H.R. 23 (2000). 
 91. See FORSTINGER, supra note 34, at 41–48; Werner F. Ebke, Centros—Some Realities and 
Some Mysteries, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 623 (2000). 
 92. FORSTINGER, supra note 34, at 158. 
 93. Deakin, supra note 89, at 211. 
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solutions to emerge.”94 Beyond this assessment, which is reflected in 
parallel discussions regarding future prospects of European harmonization 
programs,95 lies a subtle theoretical appraisal of the harmonization 
processes that ties this debate back to issues of legal transplantation and 
system change. The paradigm of reflexive law, originally developed in 
response to regulatory deadlock resulting from political pressure against 
juridification in the 1970s and early 1980s,96 has received increased 
recognition in present international debates. This recognition has occurred 
in the context of European integration97 and corporate law regulation,98 as 
well as that of international environmental protection and sustainable 
development.99 At present, reflexive law unfolds in an even more intricate 
manner, as comparative views on legal transplantation often fail to capture 
the co-evolutionary processes that unfold in a given legal, social, and 
political order when legal transplantation takes place. Rather than a mere 
integration into another legal order, what actually takes place is a 
sophisticated process of interaction and confrontation between the 
imported instrument and other areas and regulatory spheres within the 
receiving system. As an imported legal standard is introduced into the 
receiving legal order, the connected social systems (including industrial 
relations, insurance, financing, and production regimes), each with its own 
 94. FORSTINGER, supra note 34, at 159. 
 95. Michael Dougan, Minimum Harmonization and the Internal Market, 37 COMMON MKT. L. 
REV. 853, 858 (2000) (describing the move from Single Market harmonization policy to the 
integration of more policy objectives through consecutive treaties since 1986). 
 96. See Klaus Günther, Der Wandel der Staatsaufgaben und die Krise des regulativen Rechts 
[Changing State Functions and the Crisis of Regulatory Law], in WACHSENDE STAATSAUFGABEN—
SINKENDE STEUERUNGSFÄHIGKEIT DES RECHTS [INCREASING STATE FUNCTIONS—SINKING 
REGULATORY ABILITY OF THE LAW] 51 (Dieter Grimm ed., 1990); Gunther Teubner, Juridification—
Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions, in JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 
1987); Gunther Teubner, Reflexives Recht, 68 ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 13 
(1982); Rudolf Wiethölter, Materialization and Proceduralization in Modern Law, in DILEMMAS OF 
LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE 221 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1986). 
 97. See Michael Dougan, Vive la Différence? Exploring the Legal Framework for Reflexive 
Harmonisation Within the Single European Market, in THE ANNUAL OF GERMAN & EUROPEAN LAW 
(Russell A. Miller & Peer Zumbansen ed., forthcoming 2004). 
 98. Deakin, supra note 89, at 211–13; FORSTINGER, supra note 34, at 158–69. Fortsinger states: 
“This approach uses both centralized regulation of minimum standards to overcome market failures, 
existing specifically in the area of takeovers, and some degree of self-regulation to preserve space for 
autonomous governance at member state level.” Id. at 158. He continues, “The aim of reflexive 
harmonization is to protect the diversity of national legal systems, while at the same time seeking to 
channel the process of evolutionary adaption of rules at state level.” Id. at 160. 
 99. See Peter Cornelius & Bruce Kogut, Creating the Responsible Firm: In Search for a New 
Corporate Governance Paradigm, 4 GERMAN L.J. 45 (2003), available at 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol04No01/PDF_Vol_04_No_01_45-52_Private_Cornelius_K
ogut.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2003). 
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internal dynamics, will likely be aggravated by this import.100 This 
perspective ultimately illuminates the tenacity displayed by different 
systems during the process of European integration while, at the same 
time, helping us better understand the complex interplay of legal reform, 
political decisions, and embedded cultural and social systems. Regarding 
the earlier allusion to widespread emergence of self-regulation in the 
context of corporate law and other fields,101 a reflexive law approach that 
considers the co-evolutionary processes of minimum harmonization and 
ongoing processes of self-regulation and adaptation in the Member States 
might prove particularly helpful because it facilitates ongoing deliberation 
and mutual education.102 In this respect, the legislative aftermath of the 
Takeover Directive, along with the passage of a German Takeover Act, 
might prove enormously helpful to the continuing search for an adequate 
European takeover regime, a search that will ultimately be a learning 
process. 
 100. Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: How Unifying Law Ends Up In New Divergences, in 
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 417 
(Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001). 
 101. See Mark Bevir & R.A.W. Rhodes, Searching for Civil Society: Changing Patterns of 
Governance in Britain, 81 PUB. ADMIN. 41 (2003); Robert Elgie, Governance Traditions and 
Narratives in Public Sector Reform in Contemporary France, 81 PUB. ADMIN. 141 (2003); Richard J. 
Stillman II, Twenty-First Century United States Governance: Statecraft and the Peculiar Governing 
Paradox it Perpetuates, 81 PUB. ADMIN. 19 (2003). 
 102. This point is adequately stressed by FORSTINGER, supra note 34, at 155, 160–62; cf. Baums, 
Zur Harmonisierung, supra note 7, at 14. The conceptual background for the establishment of 
governance schemes on the European level that allow for mutual learning among the different Member 
States, developed by means of the Open Method of Coordination (‘OMC’), was presented at the EU’s 
Lisbon Council in 2000. See Joanne Scott & David Trubek, Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches 
to Governance in the European Union, 8 EUR. L.J. 1 (2002) (assessing the OMC). “Unlike the 
[classical community method], which is designed to create law at the Union level, the OMC aims to 
coordinate the actions of the several Member States in a given policy domain and to create conditions 
for mutual learning that hopefully will induce some degree of voluntary policy convergence.” Id. at 4 
(emphasis added). See also Diamond Ashiagbor, SOFT HARMONISATION: LABOUR LAW, ECONOMIC 
THEORY AND THE EUROPEAN EMPLOYMENT STRATEGY 226 (2002); PHIL SYRPIS, LEGITIMISING 
EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE: TAKING SUBSIDIARITY SERIOUSLY WITHIN THE OPEN METHOD OF 
COORDINATION (2002); Dougan, Vive la Différence?, supra note 97; Dermot Hodson & Imelda Maher, 
The Open Method as a New Mode of Governance: The Case of Soft Economic Policy Coordination, 39 
J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 719 (2001). 
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